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Kansas v. Hendricks: Fighting for Children
on the Slippery Slope

In Kansas v. Hendricks,' the United States Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of a civil commitment statute that provides
for possible indefinite confinement of sex offenders who are near the end
of their prison sentences and who pose a threat to society and suffer
from a "mental abnormality." In a five to four decision, the Court
reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld Kansas's Sexually
Violent Predator Act ("SVPA7). In doing so, the Court declared the act
nonpenal and rejected due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
challenges.'
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In Hendricks, the State filed a petition seeking civil commitment of
Leroy Hendricks under Kansas's SVPA.4 The SVPA, passed in 1994,
attempts to reduce the threat that repeat sex offenders pose to society.'
Before a sex offender can be committed, the SVPA requires that certain
criteria are met." First, the individual must have been previously
charged with or convicted of a sexually violent offense.' Second, the
individual must suffer from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder." Third, the individual, because of the mental abnormality,
must pose a threat to society." If these indicia are met, several
procedural steps must be satisfied before the individual is committed.10
Initially, the State must file a petition seeking confinement." Next, a

1.
2.

117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
Id. at 2086. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a (1994).

3. 117 S. Ct. at 2086,
4. Id. at 2078.
5. Id. at 2076.
6. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01.
7. Id. § 59-29a02.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id. § 59-29a01.
117 S. Ct. at 2077.
Id.
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hearing is held to determine whether there is probable cause that the
individual is a "sexually violent predator." 2 If probable cause is found,
the individual must undergo a professional medical evaluation."3
doubt, whether the
Finally, a trial is held to find, beyond a reasonable
4
individual is a sexually violent predator.
Leroy Hendricks was convicted in 1984 for taking "indecent liberties"
with two thirteen year-old boys. Prior to that, Hendricks had been
convicted four times for similar sex crimes with minors. At the hearing
to determine probable cause, Hendricks agreed with a professional
evaluation that labeled him as a pedophile. He also admitted that he
could not control his urges when he got "stressed out."" The jury
found Hendricks to be a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the court determined pedophilia to be a mental abnormality
and committed Hendricks.1"
Hendricks appealed, contending that the SVPA violated due process,
double jeopardy, and the ex post facto clause. 7 The Kansas Supreme
Court looked only to the due process challenge. 8 It held that the SVPA
violated due process by allowing civil commitment based on a finding
of dangerousness coupled with a mental abnormality." The court
reasoned that the statute's mental abnormality requirement fell below
the mental illness requirement affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court in Foucha v. Louisiana.20
The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for
certiorari and reversed the Kansas Supreme Court.2'

The Court

rejected the due process claim, stating that it has "never required state
legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil
commitment statutes," and it also dismissed Hendricks's double jeopardy
and ex post facto claims.22

12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2078-79.

16. Id. at 2079.
17. Id.
18. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (1996). The Kansas Supreme Court decided the
case on Hendricks's due process challenge and therefore did not have to address the double
jeopardy or ex post facto challenges.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 137 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)). The Court in Foucha
affirmed the holding inAddington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425-33 (1978), requiring that civil
commitment be predicated on clear and convincing evidence that the individual was
mentally ill and dangerous to others. 504 U.S. at 86.
21. 117 S. Ct. at 2076.
22. Id. at 2081.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court announced long ago that a person's civil liberty
interest "is not [an] unrestricted license to act according to one's own
will."' Those restrictions on civil liberty began to take modern form
when the Court began considering the constitutionality of civil commitment statutes.
Modern boundaries of civil commitment were initially set when the
Court upheld a Minnesota statute in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v.
Probate Court.24 The Court upheld confinement. of a dangerous
individual with a "psychopathic personality." 5 Rejecting an equal
protection challenge, the Court applied a rational basis test to the group
affected by the statute and decided that the protection of society was a
legitimate concern.26 A separate due process challenge was defeated
because the statute provided adequate procedural safeguards.27
8 the Court held it unconstitutional for an
In O'Connorv. Donaldson,"
individual to remain committed if the individual does not pose a threat
to society.' In that case Donaldson was initially committed because
he suffered from "paranoid schizophrenia." 0 During his fifteen years
of commitment, Donaldson never exhibited dangerous behavior. In fact,
testimony demonstrated that Donaldson never committed a dangerous
act.3 The Court held that Donaldson should have been released, even
if the initial confinement was permissible, because "[a] finding of 'mental
illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will
is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons
I
. * [Tihere
involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one." 2 Therefore, the Court
established that two requirements must be met to justify involuntary
confinement-the individual must suffer from a mental illness and must
pose a threat to society.33
The Court's next major civil commitment case came four years later
in Addington v. Texas. 4 The Court affirmed the two-part test formu-

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
309 U.S. 270 (1940).
Id. at 271, 277.
Id. at 274-75.
Id at 277.
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576.
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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lated in O'Connor for civil commitment and also announced the
evidentiary requirements.' Appellant contended that the State must
prove the two elements beyond a reasonable doubt, while the State
argued that a preponderance of the evidence standard should be
applied. 6 The Court adopted a middle level "clear and convincing
standard."37 A clear and convincing standard, the Court reasoned,
protected individuals against erroneous commitment and also served the
legitimate interests of the State. 8
In Foucha v. Louisiana,9 the Supreme Court held that states may
not become too liberal in their commitment practices. 0 Although a
review panel recommended that Terry Foucha, an insane acquittee, be
conditionally discharged, the State recommitted him. Foucha did not
have a mental illness, but the State held him because he demonstrated
an antisocial personality, which rendered him a danger to others.4 1
Foucha argued his due process rights were violated.42 The Court
agreed and held that an antisocial personality fell below the mental
illness requirement.'
However, a civil commitment statute may be unconstitutional even
though it meets the two-part O'Connor test if its proceedings are
punitive rather than civil." If an act is punitive, it may offend the
Double Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause. 41 When determining whether the act is civil or punitive, courts look to a variety of
factors. First, courts may look to legislative intent.' If the legislature's stated intent was to establish a civil proceeding, then the
challenging party must show by "'the clearest proof that 'the statutory
scheme [was] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
State's] intention' to deem it 'civil."'' 4

35. Id. at 432-33.
36. Id. at 421-22.
37. Id. at 433.
38. Id. at 425-26.
39. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
40. Id. at 86.
41. Id. at 75.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 78.
44. 117 S. Ct. at 2081-82.
45. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984).
46. 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
47. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). Legislative intent
may be shown by placing the statute in the civil code. Id. However, the "civil label" is not
always dispositive. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986).
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Second, courts may look to various provisions of the act. If the act
does not require scienter, the act appears civil." Moreover, affirmative
restraint does not lead to a punitive conclusion.49 Also, an act will not
necessarily be punitive if it implements procedural safeguards found in
criminal trials.50 Rather, those safeguards ensure that the group
intended to be affected is actually the group affected by the statute.51
Ultimately, the civil or punitive distinction turns on "'whether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].'" 2

III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held as constitutional the
Kansas civil commitment statute applying to sex offenders who suffer
from a mental abnormality making them dangerous to society." In
upholding the SVPA, the Court rejected three constitutional attacks."
First, the Court addressed and rejected Hendricks's due process attack
that the SVPA's requirement of a mental abnormality fell below the
standard of mental illness. 5 While freedom from physical restraint is
at the core of the liberty element of the Due Process Clause, the Court
noted that this freedom is not unrestricted when those restrictions are
necessary for the common good.' Moreover, the statute's requirement
of a mental abnormality linked to a danger to society comports with
previously upheld state civil commitment statutes."7 While the term
"mental illness" is not explicitly used, the Court looked to Jones v.
United States" and acknowledged that state legislatures maintain
discretion in drafting civil statutes.5 9 The Court also recognized that

48. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). Scienter is a customary
element for distinguishing criminal from civil statutes. Id.
49. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
50. 478 U.S. at 371.
51. 117 S.Ct. at 2083.
52. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
53. 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2081.
56. Id. at 2079.
57. Id. at 2080 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (upholding a Kentucky statute
permitting commitment of an individual who was "mentally retarded" or"mentally ill" and
dangerous), and Pearson, 309 U.S. at 270 (upholding a Minnesota statute allowing
commitment of a dangerous individual with a "psychopathic personality")).
58. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
59. Id. at 370.
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it has previously "used a variety of expressions to describe the mental
condition of those properly subject to civil confinement.' ° Thus,
because the Kansas statute established similar criteria to other
constitutional commitment statutes and because pedophilia is considered
a serious mental disorder, the Court found that Hendricks had been
afforded due process."'
The Court then addressed the double jeopardy and ex post facto
challenges using similar reasoning to defeat both claims.62 The Court
determined that because the SVPA is civil in nature, neither constitutional safeguard was offended.' Many factors led to this determination. First, the SVPA does not pursue either objective of criminal
punishment. It is not retributive because prior criminal conduct does
not lead to culpability; rather, the conduct is used only as evidence to
demonstrate a danger to society." It is not a deterrent because
individuals suffering from mental abnormalities cannot control their
conduct despite knowledge of possible negative ramifications."
Second, although the SVPA involves an affirmative restraint, it does
not amount to a punitive measure by the state. Restraint of the
mentally ill has historically been regarded as nonpunitive. Furthermore,
the purpose behind restraint under the SVPA is to provide treatment for
those committed until they are no longer threatening to the community.
Accordingly, the act provides for the immediate release upon a showing
that a committed individual is no longer dangerous."
Third, the Court rejected Hendricks's arguments that punitive intent
is shown because the SVPA incorporates procedures used in a criminal
proceeding 7 and because commitment may follow a prison term." A
state's decision to provide safeguards usually applied in criminal trials
does not make the proceeding criminal rather than civil.69 Instead, the
SVPA's requirement that a jury find the individual to be a sexually
violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt narrows the class affected

60. 117 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26, and Jackson, 406 U.S. at
732, 737).

61. Id. at 2081.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2085.
64. Id. at 2082. The Court also found that the act was not retributive because criminal
conviction is not a prerequisite for commitment under the SVPA. Moreover, the lack of a
scienter requirement was further evidence that the SVPA was not intended to be
retributive. Id.
65. Id.
66.
67.

Id. at 2083.
Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
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and ensures that commitment is justified. 70 Finally, the Court cited
Baxstrom v. Herold71 and held that commitment following a prison
term is not distinguishable from any other commitment.72 The Court's
conclusion that the SVPA is nonpunitive removed an essential prerequisite of double jeopardy and ex post facto claims and mandated that both
claims fail."3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy focused on whether the
Kansas statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.74 Justice Kennedy
stated, "Ifthe object or purpose of the Kansas law had been to provide
treatment but the treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere
pretext, there would have been an indication of the forbidden purpose to
punish."75 However, in this instance, the concurrence concluded that
the provisions for treatment and the "attendant protections" demonstrate
its nonpunitive purpose.'
Cautioning against the dangers of civil
commitment statutes, Justice Kennedy closed by warning that future
statutes will be struck if they fail to administer adequate treatment or
provide for commitment without a solid basis.77
The dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, conceded that the SVPA did not violate the Due
Process Clause, but did violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.7'
The
dissenters accepted Hendrick's contention that the SVPA is punitive for
.several reasons.79 First, the Court should give deference to the findings
of the state supreme court regarding the intent or purpose of the
legislature.80 The Kansas Supreme Court found that treatment was
"incidental at best.""1 Second, the statute committed sex offenders after
they served the majority of their criminal sentence.82 Justice Breyer
thought that commitment and treatment should begin much sooner.'
Third, the statute did not mandate the consideration of less restrictive

70. Id.
71. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
72. 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
73. Id. at 2085-86.
74. Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. I&
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2087-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined only Parts II and
III of the dissent. Parts II and III addressed the violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
79. Id. at 2088.
80. Id. at 2092 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)).
81. Id. (citing Hendricks, 912 P.2d. at 136).
82. Id. at 2093.
83. Id. at 2093-94.
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measures such as postrelease supervision or release to a halfway
house."' Ultimately, the dissent looked to the lack of treatment and
decided that "[tihe statutory provisions before us do amount to punishment primarily because... the legislature did not tailor the statute to
fit the nonpunitive civil aim of treatment.""'
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The decision in Hendricks will have significant implications. First and
foremost, it furthers the trend of tightening down on sex offenders. Over
the past few years, numerous states have passed "Megan's Laws."'
Megan's Laws, named after Megan Kanka, a seven year-old girl who was
raped and killed by a two-time sex offender, typically require community
notification upon the release of sex offenders from prison. 7 Even
President Clinton signed a federal version that terminates federal
anticrime funding if states do not pass similar laws."
Other states have taken a different route and passed chemical
castration laws. 9 Chemical castration statutes are criminal statutes
that punish violators. For example, a California statute provides for the
chemical castration of convicts after their third conviction for rape or
other specified sex offenses. ° While California's statute offers castration as one alternative for punishment, some state statutes require
chemical castration upon conviction. 91
With the Court holding that the Kansas SVPA is civil, states will now
have a much more powerful weapon against sex offenders. States can
now commit sex offenders, before they commit another illegal sex act,
based on a lower burden of proof. Freedom from confinement will only
be granted when the individual shows that he is more likely than not
reformed and does not present a danger to society.
Not only will states have far more power to incapacitate sex offenders,
it is likely that many states will use this power. Surveys, based only on
re-arrests, show sex offenders have alarmingly high rates of recidivism,

84. Id. at 2095 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (holding that failure to
consider less harsh alternatives can show the legislature's purpose was to punish)).
85. Id. at 2098.
86. Michael G. Planty & Louise van der Does, Megan's Laws Aren't Enough, WALL ST.
J., July 17, 1997, at A22.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Kenneth B. Fromson, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castrationas an Alternative

Sentencing Measure, 113 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 316 n.24 (1994).
90. Id. at 315.
91. Id. Hawaii's proposed statute requires castration of those convicted of first degree
sexual assault. Id.
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ten to forty percent for molesters and seven to thirty-five percent for
rapists."2 Further the average pedophile "commits 282 illegal acts with
150 different victims."93 Responding to these numbers, thirty-seven
states filed amicus briefs supporting Kansas." States like Washington,
New York, and Massachusetts, which have had their respective sexual
predator statutes struck for constitutional violations, can now pass new
statutes. 95 For these states, the Kansas SVPA provides the standard
for what is constitutional.
While states have gained considerable power in the defense of society,
one must now ask where that power will stop. During oral arguments,
Justice O'Connor expressed a similar concern when she asked, "Could a
State lock up any kind of violent offender who's diagnosed as having a
mental abnormality?"9 It seems that the criminal system is better
suited to administer this type of incarceration. It would be relatively
easy for state legislatures to adopt stiffer sentences for sex crimes.
Instead, states are able to indefinitely commit sex offenders without
having to prove them so beyond a reasonable doubt.
Practically, the issue for civil commitment now becomes what qualifies
as a mental abnormality or mental illness. Unfortunately there is no
exact answer to this question. The psychiatric field disagrees about
what qualifies as a mental illness.97 The Supreme Court has also used
a variety of terms that submit individuals to civil commitment.98
Therefore, the standard announced in Hendricks seems to blur. Without
a clear standard, the slippery slope comes into play. How far down the
slope will states go in order to protect children, and what personality
disorders will provide the basis for future commitment are questions
that remain unanswered. For now, the only concrete conclusion is that
pedophiles suffer from a legally recognizable mental abnormality.
MICHAEL L. ATLEE

92. Planty, supra note 86, at A22.
93. Id.
94. Carla J. Stovall, Supreme Court to ConsiderLaw Keeping PredatorConfined, 31APR Prosecutor 26, 31 (1997).
95. Cindy Moy, Sexually Violent PredatorActs Face More Constitutional Challenges,
WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, 1996 WL 672399.
96. Hendricks, WL 721073 (1996).
97. 117 U.S. at 2080-81 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)).
98. Id. at 2081.

